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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1171 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHN GAGLIARDI, 
 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM STANDISH; JOY FLOWERS CONTI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-01546) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (filed : June 16, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 John Gagliardi appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 Gagliardi‟s complaint, which names two federal judges, arises from previous 
actions that he filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  In 1986, Gagliardi filed six actions that were consolidated before The 
Honorable William L. Standish.  Gagliardi moved to disqualify Judge Standish, who 
placed financial records accompanying the motion under seal in 1989.  Gagliardi filed 
another action in 2006 that was assigned to The Honorable Joy Flowers Conti.  Gagliardi 
moved to disqualify her as well and, according to him, court staff removed his papers 
from the record because they contained a picture of the judge that staff deemed 
improper.
1
  Each of these actions was dismissed, and the appeal period long ago expired. 
Gagliardi later filed the complaint at issue here, alleging generally that Judges 
Standish and Conti were biased against him and interfered with the public right of access 
to court records.  The only specific relief he requests is that the District Court (1) “[o]rder 
a permanent and absolute recusal” of both judges from any proceeding involving him as a 
party or witness in the future, and (2) “[e]njoin the continued impoundment” of the 
documents referenced above.  (Compl. at 15-16.)  By order entered December 16, 2010, 
the District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Gagliardi sought reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  
                                                 
1
 Despite Gagliardi‟s apparent claim that court staff removed his motion from the 
record altogether, a motion for disqualification and supporting affidavits are docketed 
and electronically available.  (W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-00095, Docket Nos. 17-19.) 
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Gagliardi appeals.
2
 
II. 
  Gagliardi argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint before 
the defendants responded.  Although district courts must dismiss complaints for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction whenever it is lacking, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), they 
generally should not do so before service of process, see Urbano v. Calissi, 353 F.2d 196, 
197 (3d Cir. 1965).
3
  We have never held, however, that dismissal before service 
invariably requires remand.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (requiring determination of appeal 
“without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties”).  We conclude that the District Court‟s dismissal before service was harmless in 
this case because its lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the complaint. 
 The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate collateral 
challenges in the nature of appeals and alleged violations of the codes of judicial 
conduct.
4
  We agree, and add that Gagliardi‟s specific requests for relief raise a more 
                                                 
2
 Gagliardi appeals only from the District Court‟s dismissal of his complaint and not 
its denial of reconsideration.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and “[w]e 
review a district court‟s determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”  
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 110 (3d Cir. 2010).  Gagliardi filed another motion 
for reconsideration and a motion to disqualify the District Judge at the same time he 
filed this appeal.  The District Court denied those motions, but Gagliardi has not 
appealed from those rulings. 
 
3
 The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) do not apply to Gagliardi because he paid 
the fee to file his complaint. 
 
4
 The District Court also noted that any other claims would be barred by judicial 
immunity.  In response, Gagliardi emphasizes that he seeks only prospective 
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fundamental impediment.  Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power only 
to “Cases” or “Controversies.”  See Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int‟l Union of 
Operating Eng‟rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  Several 
justiciability doctrines, including standing and ripeness, flow from that limitation.  See id.  
Under those doctrines, the judicial power extends only to injuries that, inter alia, are 
“„actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical‟” and that are likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision.  Pa. Prison Soc‟y v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 228 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted).   
Gagliardi claims no such injury here.  First, he seeks an injunction barring Judges 
Standish and Conti from presiding over any action in which he might become involved in 
the future.  Gagliardi, however, does not allege anything suggesting that that possibility is 
more than speculative.  His prior actions are closed and the time for appealing has passed.  
Thus, this claim does not present a justiciable dispute.  See Thomas v. Tenneco 
Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 n.34 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting as unripe counsel‟s 
request for judge‟s disqualification from “any other . . . case in which she appears as 
counsel”); United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 636 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that 
witnesses lacked standing to seek disqualification of judge where “there is no pending 
action before [him] in which the rights of the petitioners are at issue”).  If Gagliardi files 
another action that is assigned to Judges Standish or Conti, then he can seek 
                                                                                                                                                             
injunctive relief, to which he argues immunity does not apply.  We need not address 
that issue because the District Court‟s lack of jurisdiction is dispositive. 
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disqualification in that proceeding (though we express no opinion on whether it might be 
warranted).  See Sciarra, 851 F.2d at 636. 
 Second, Gagliardi does not claim any injury from the alleged state of the record.  
He does not claim any need for the documents that Judge Standish sealed in 1989, and he 
concedes that he “remains in possession” of the documents at issue in his proceeding 
before Judge Conti.  (Compl. at 13 ¶ 52.)  Cf. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 
772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994) (addressing third-party standing to seek “access to information or 
judicial proceedings”).  Nor does he allege that the state of the record prevented him from 
taking any action in those proceedings or in any other.  To the contrary, if Gagliardi 
wished to contest the judges‟ alleged actions in those proceedings, then he could have 
sought relief on appeal.  As explained above, the time for doing so has passed. 
 One final matter merits mention.  Gagliardi argues that the District Judge should 
have recused himself in this case.  The denial of his disqualification motion is not before 
us, however, because he filed it after the District Court entered the only order under 
review.  Nor has Gagliardi raised anything calling the District Judge‟s partiality into 
question, and the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his complaint in any event. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5
                                                 
5
 The motions of proposed amicus-appellant Alan Wakefield for leave to proceed as 
amicus curiae, and of Gagliardi to join in that motion, are granted. 
